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The Execution of Search Warrants
by H. Patrick Furman
D iscussions of search warrants
generally focus on questions of
probable cause or the reliabili-
ty of information ontained in
the affidavit submitted with the applica-
tion for the warrant. Less attention is fo-
cused on issues that surround the actual
execution of the warrant. This article ad-
dresses some of the issues that surround
the actual execution of a warrant, includ-
ing the detention or search of persons who
are present at the premises being searched,
the interpretation of the scope of the war-
rant, the execution of"no knock" warrants,
the right of the police to secure premises
before executing warrants, and the prop-
er documentation of affidavits and war-
rants.
Persons at the Scene
It is quite common that persons are ei-
ther present at the premises to be searched,
or arrive while the search is in progress.
The question often arises whether such
persons can be detained or searched as
part of the execution of the search war-
rant for the premises. The general princi-
ple is that police officers executing a
search warrant have authority to ques-
tion and even detain persons who are on
the premises, but that an actual search of
such persons requires either a particular-
ized suspicion or authorization in the war-
rant.
There are several justifications under-
lying the principle that the police may gen-
erally question or detain persons found at
the premises. Because a magistrate has
authorized a significant intrusion into pri-
vacy interests when a warrant is issued,
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questioning or detention of persons at the
premises being searched may be viewed
as an insignificant additional threat to
protected privacy interests. Additionally,
questioning or detention may be neces-
sary for the safety of the officers execut-
ing the search, to prevent the destruction
of evidence, or to ensure that the search
takes place in an orderly fashion. In Mich-
igan v. Summers,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that reasonable suspicion to detain
an individual is created when the police
are armed with a warrant to search the
individual's home and encounter him or
her leaving as they approach to execute
the warrant. The police are entitled to de-
tain the person while the search takes
place.
A more strict analysis applies to frisks
and searches of persons present at the
premises, because such actions are far
more significant intrusions into protect-
ed privacy interests. In Ybarra v. Illinois,2
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the mere
presence of a person at the place to be
searched did not open him or her up to a
frisk by the police. To justify a frisk, the
Court held that there must be a particu-
larized and reasonable suspicion that the
person is armed or dangerous.3 Ybarra
remains the law,4 but a number of subse-
quent cases have distinguished Ybarra or
limited the application of its rule.
The particularized and reasonable sus-
picion exception is illustrated by People v.
Hughes.5 There, police officers executing
a search warrant for drugs conducted a
pat-down search of the defendant, who
was neither the resident nor named in
the warrant, and found a film cannister.
They opened the cannister and found co-
caine. The trial court suppressed the can-
nister. The Colorado Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that while Ybarra limits
searches of people who are present dur-
ing the execution of a search warrant, it
does not prohibit them. Such a search must
be justified under the rationale of Terry v.
Ohio.6 The defendant in Hughes general-
ly fit the description of the alleged suppli-
er and, even though that information was
not in the warrant, it was enough to justi-
fy the pat down, particularly since the de-
fendant made a furtive gesture. Once the
cannister was lawfully seized, it could be
searched; it was a "vessel" in the room and
the warrant authorized the search of such
vessels.
The majority of courts that have ad-
dressed searches of other persons present
when a search warrant is executed have
held that the propriety of such a search
turns on whether there is probable cause
to believe the person searched was in-
volved in the criminal activity7 The scale
of the illegal activity relative to the size of
the structure in which it is taking place is
the key factor in determining whether a
search of the persons present at the scene
is reasonable. Compare a dice game in a
back room with an illegal lottery ticket
sale in a factory. It is reasonable to as-
sume everyone in the back room is in-
volved in the former activity, but unrea-
sonable to make a similar assumption
with regard to all persons present in the
factory. This sort of analysis will meet the
constitutional mandate of specificity and
avoid the dangers inherent in general war-
rants.
The bottom line is that there is adequate
specificity when the executing officer can
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readily determine to whom the warrant
applies. The probable cause requirement
was met in People v. Johnson8 because of
the tight security around the house in
which the drugs were being manufactured
(no one who was not involved could get
in) and the sophisticated nature of the op-
eration. It was clear that everyone inside
the home was involved and therefore rea-
sonable to authorize a search of all those
persons.
A recent Colorado case illustrating these
principles is People v. Ornelas,9 in which
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that
it was permissible for the police, while ex-
ecuting a search warrant of the defen-
dant's home, to detain him in handcuffs
and then, after cocaine was discovered in
the home, arrest him. The court held that
the detention was not a full-blown arrest,
but more akin to a Stone-Terry detention.' 9
The detention was based on the fact that
a neutral magistrate had already author-
ized the significant intrusion of a search
of the home, and justified by the need to
ensure officer safety, guard against de-
struction of evidence, and promote the or-
derly execution of the warrant."
Another exception to the Ybarra rule
may be created if the warrant itself au-
thorizes the search of persons present
when the warrant is executed. The war-
rant issued in Johnson12 authorized a
search of the home and "all persons found
within or in the immediate vicinity of the
residence," and was based on probable
cause to believe that drug manufacturing
and selling were taking place in the home.
The defendant was found inside when
the warrant was executed and was ar-
rested after $950 was found in his sock.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress. Ybarra was distinguished be-
cause the search in that case took place in
a public place and because the warrant is-
sued in that case did not authorize search-
es of persons.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals has held
that a no-knock search warrant that au-
thorized the search of an apartment and
the persons found therein for implements
related to the manufacture and storage of
marijuana and LSD authorized the search
of the purse of a nonresident who was in
the apartment.13 The occupants were
handcuffed and the purse seized from a
bedroom. The police inquired as to own-
ership, and a nonresident juvenile claimed
ownership. The police found drugs in the
purse. The court suppressed the juvenile's
response to the question because the po-
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lice should not have questioned the juve-
nile in the absence of a parent or guard-
ian, but permitted the introduction of the
contents of the purse.
Scope of the Search
Warrant
The Fourth Amendment requires that
a warrant"particularly describ[e] the place
to be searched." Article II, § 7 of the Col-
orado Constitution requires that a war-
rant "describ[e] the place to be searched...
as near as may be." These requirements
are designed to prevent general search-
es 14 but, like other constitutional com-




seemingly little connection to
the fixed premises may fall
within the scope of a
search warrant."
In United States v. Ross,16 the U.S. Su-
preme Court made it clear that a warrant
that authorizes the search of fixed prem-
ises generally authorizes the search of
every part of the premises in which the
object of the search may be located, even
if such a search involves additional open-
ings and entries. Thus, the police may
search cabinets and drawers in a search
for drugs that might be secreted therein.
Some parts of the premises have less
connection to the "fixed premises" than
others. The affidavit in support of the
search warrant issued in People v. Mu-
niz 17 established probable cause to be-
lieve that the shotgun being sought was
located in the defendant's home. The war-
rant itself authorized a search of "the
premises above described." The police ex-
ecuting the search found nothing in the
defendant's home, so they searched a
small, unattached storage shed located
approximately thirty feet from the home
in an enclosed area to which the defen-
dant had ready access. The shotgun was
found in the shed. The trial court sup-
pressed the shotgun because the word
"premises" did not appear in the affidavit
and because the affidavit itself indicated
that the shotgun would be found in "the
house."
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed,
first noting that the trial court erred in its
reading of the affidavit, which, in fact, twice
used the word "premises." More important-
ly, the court held that the trial courts inter-
pretation was "a hypertechnical construc-
tion" of a sort that has been condemned
by the U.S. Supreme Court."' The court
noted that affidavits are often drafted by
nonlawyers in the haste of a criminal in-
vestigation and that over-reliance on tech-
nicalities of the sort required by common
law pleadings may discourage the police
from seeking judicial approval before act-
ing.
However, the court declined to adopt a
per se rule that all of the buildings at a lo-
cation to be searched are automatically
included within the terms of the warrant.
The detective executing the search in this
case first searched the home, where he
found other items specified in the warrant,
and ended the search of the shed once he
found the shotgun. Therefore, there was
little danger of an improper exploratory
search. The court also warned against ov-
er-reliance on printed forms and reiterat-
ed that every affidavit and warrant "should
be carefully prepared to fit the require-
ments of the particular case."1 9
In United States v. Percival,20 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a search warrant
authorizing the search of a home also au-
thorized the search of a car found in the
garage, even though the car belonged to
a third party. A car has less connection to
premises than does, say, furniture. How-
ever, the defendant's use of the car, cou-
pled with the fact that the car was locked
in the defendant's garage and the defen-
dant was in possession of the keys, estab-
lished that the defendant had dominion
and control over the car sufficient to jus-
tify including the car in the scope of the
warrant. The court noted that the better
practice would be to include a description
of the car in the warrant, but holds that
such practice is not required by the Fourth
Amendment. Other courts have reached
the same general conclusion.21
Even property with seemingly little con-
nection to the fixed premises may fall
within the scope of a search warrant. In
People v. Tufts,22 the police obtained a war-
rant to search the defendant's home after
validly arresting the defendant and oth-
ers following a controlled buy of narcotics.
During the search, the police found a vi-
nyl bag that apparently belonged to a de-
fendant who did not live in the home but
had been arrested in connection with the
buy. The Colorado Supreme Court held
CRIMINAL LAW NEWSLETTER April
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that the search of the bag was authorized
by the warrant, particularly in light of the
fact that probable cause already existed
to arrest the defendant.
The generally broad interpretation of
the scope of a search warrant is not with-
out limits. In United States v. Stanley,2
the Fourth Circuit held that a warrant au-
thorizing a search of the defendant's mo-
bile home did not authorize a search of
the defendant's car when that car was
parked in a parking lot used by several
residents of the mobile home park. The
car was near the mobile home, but was
not within the general enclosure surround-
ing the mobile home.
Information in the affidavit or warrant
may expand the permissible scope of a
search. The Colorado Supreme Court has
approved language in a warrant author-
izing a search of a home and "all vehicles"
on the property,' rejecting a claim that
such language was impermissibly broad.
The court also has held that information
in an affidavit relating to the possibility
of blood evidence justified the seizure of
items, such as bedding, which might rea-
sonably contain blood evidence, even when
no blood was visible at the time of the sei-
zure. The same analysis justified the sei-
zure of hair samples found on a shirt at
the scene of the search because the victim
of the offense had been hit on, and bled
from, his head. 5
Scope of the Search Itself
Obviously, the law enforcement person-
nel executing the search warrant are gen-
erally confined to the terms of the war-
rant. However, a good-faith mistake that
is understandable and objectively reason-
able may bring an otherwise overbroad
search within constitutional bounds. In
Maryland v. Garrison,26 police obtained
and executed a warrant to search "the
premises known as 2036 Park Avenue
third floor apartment" They believed the
entire third floor was one apartment, and
the mistake was not discovered until they
had already discovered incriminating ev-
idence in the second apartment on the
third floor. The U.S. Supreme Court, by a
6-3 vote, reasoned that both the warrant
and the execution thereof were proper be-
cause the mistaken information in the af-
fidavit and the mistake in the actual ex-
ecution were both objectively reasonable.
A flagrant disregard of the limits of a
search warrant may result in the suppres-
sion of all items seized in the search, in-
cluding those items that were within the
scope of the warrant.27 In United States v.
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Foster,28 police officers executing a valid
search warrant seized, pursuant to their
standard policy, virtually everything of
value in the home, including items that
were neither contraband nor linked to any
illegal activity. The court found that the
officers acted "in flagrant disregard for the
terms of the warrant,"29 and suppressed
all of the items seized in the search, in-
cluding the weapons that were the object
of the search. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed,30 holding that the trial court's
findings were amply supported by the rec-
ord and that this remedy, while extreme,
was justified in cases of flagrant disre-
gard of the warrant.
The Knock and
Announce Rule
People v. Lujan3' is a good starting point
for a discussion of the general require-
ment that the police knock and announce
their presence before entering premises
to execute a warrant. In Lujan, the Col-
orado Supreme Court noted that the rule
of prior notice dates back to a 1603 Eng-
lish decision.32 While no English cases cre-
ated exceptions to this rule, exceptions
did develop in American decisions. Ker v.
United States3 made it clear that the fed-
eral constitution is not offended by the
creation of reasonable exceptions to the
rule.
The Lujan decision expressly approved
two exceptions to the prior announcement
rule. The first exception exists when the
warrant expressly authorizes forced en-
try without announcement. The second
exception exists when circumstances un-
known at the time of the application for
the warrant, but learned before entry, give
the police probable cause to believe that
giving notice is likely (1) to result in the
destruction of evidence, (2) to endanger
life or safety, (3) to enable a party to be ar-
rested to escape, or (4) to be a futile ges-
ture. The court approved of the police
breaking down the door to Lujan's home
with a sledgehammer when, armed with
a valid search warrant, they noticed a light
burning in a rear room of the residence,
knocked on the door, waited about a min-
ute, then knocked again and still received
no reply
As recently as 1995, the U.S. Supreme
Court noted the continued vitality of the
principle that the police generally must
knock and announce their presence be-
fore entering. In Wilson v. Arkansas,s5 the
Court held that the common law 'qmock
and announce" rule is part of the reason-
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ableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. A failure to knock and an-
nounce is not automatically unreason-
able, as the risk of danger to the officers
or of destruction of evidence may justify
a no-knock entrance, but the Court reiter-
ated that there is a presumption in favor
of announcement.36
Securing the Premises
Law enforcement officials are sometimes
allowed to "secure the premises" prior to
the execution of a search warrant. In Peo-
ple v. Gillis,3 7 police arrived at the defen-
dant's home and conducted a brief secu-
rity search of the home before discovering
that the address on the warrant was in-
correct. They told the defendant to wait
outside while they obtained a proper war-
rant. During the wait, the defendant con-
sented to a search of his home, and even-
tually led the police to the property they
were seeking.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that
the brief security search was appropriate
in order to secure the safety of the offi-
cers.38 The court also held that the volun-
tariness of the consent to search was not
affected by the fact that police told the de-
fendant that he had to wait outside, that
another warrant would be obtained, and
that the police would remain at the prem-
ises until that occurred; these comments
did not amount to improper threats or co-
ercion because they were simply descrip-
tions of permissible police actions.
The "protective sweep" rule has limits.
In People u Griffin, police developed prob-
able cause to believe the defendant had
marijuana for sale in his home. Some offi-
cers went to obtain a warrant, while two
others went to the defendants home to "se-
cure the premises" and take other "pre-
cautions" with the occupants. The officers
who went to the home went inside and
observed drug paraphernalia inside. The
Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the
suppression of the paraphernalia, ruling
that the entry could not be justified as a
protective sweep. The court upheld the
admissibility of the drugs seized pursu-
ant to the warrant because the warrant
was not based on any information re-
ceived from the officers who conducted
the illegal entry.
A similar limitation was noted in Peo-
ple v. Gifford,40 where the police obtained
information that the defendant was buy-
ing stolen goods and prepared an affidavit
for a search warrant. Before receiving the
warrant, several officers went to the de-
fendant's home, told three people on the
porch that a warrant was on the way, and
then entered without knocking. The trial
court found that the officers had violated
the knock and announce rule and that the
fact that they had told the three uniden-
tified persons they were going in did not
alter that violation. The trial court also
found that the appropriate remedy was
suppression.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed,
noting that a forcible entry need not be
accompanied by physical violence4' and
that the purpose underlying the ban on
such entries is to spare the residents the
shock of unannounced entries and to pro-
tect both the residents and the police from
the dangers that attend to unannounced
entries. There was no showing that the
subsequent seizure of the evidence was
independent of the initial illegal entry, so
suppression was the appropriate remedy.
Paperwork
Several cases have addressed questions
concerning the documents that must be
present at the time of the request for the
warrant or the time of actual search. In
People v. Donahue,4 the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the failure of the affiant
to attach to the search warrant the docu-
ment specifying the items to be seized
rendered the search warrant constitution-
ally defective.
Recently, in People v. Staton,4 the Col-
orado Supreme Court held that an affi-
davit may be used to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement
if (1) the otherwise defective warrant in-
corporates the affidavit by reference, (2)
both the warrant and the affidavit are pre-
sented to the magistrate issuing the war-
rant, and (3) the affidavit accompanies
the warrant during the execution of the
warrant. The third requirement may be
met if the police officer who is the afflant
controls and supervises the execution.
Some of the requirements relating to the
execution of a search warrant are based
in the rules or statutes, rather than in the
Constitution. In People v. McKinstry,4 the
Colorado Supreme Court reversed a dis-
trict court suppression order that had
been based on the absence of the affiants
name in the warrant. A police officer filed
an affidavit and obtained a warrant from
a judge. Rather than writing the name of
the affiant in the space provided on the
warrant, the judge caused the warrant to
read "any officer." The judge signed the
warrant and initialed the affidavit and the
attachment listing the property to be
seized. The warrant itself referred to the
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attachment, but not to the affidavit. A copy
of the affidavit was not left at the premis-
es searched. The affidavit was returned to
the court with the executed warrant, but
the documents were not stapled together.
The trial court held that strict compli-
ance with the requirements of Crim.P 41
(d) and CRS § 16-3-304 was required be-
cause the rule and statute were designed
to give effect to the right protected by the
Fourth Amendment. The Colorado Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that only
two of the four requirements of the rule
and statute-that the warrant itself con-
tain an adequate description of the place
to be searched and an adequate descrip-
tion of the items to be seized-are required
by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, there is
no constitutional violation. However, there
clearly was a violation of the rule and the
statute because the warrant did not con-
tain the name of the affiant. The trial
court held that excusing the failure to com-
ply with this requirement violated the ex-
press mandate of the legislature. A four-
person majority of the Supreme Court
found this analysis to be overly technical,
and held that the defendant was not prej-
udiced by the absence of the affiantfs name
on the warrant because he later gained
complete access to the affidavit.
Conclusion
A thorough analysis of searches con-
ducted pursuant to warrants does not end
with an analysis of the affidavit that was
filed in support of the request for the war-
rant. The actual execution of a search war-
rant is the point at which our constitu-
tional rights come face-to-face with the
power and authority of the government.
Prosecutors and law enforcement officials
must take care to ensure that warrants
are executed in a constitutional manner,
and defense counsel must challenge those
searches that are not so conducted.
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Plan Now for Popular NITA Trial Skills Program:
August 6-16 in Denver
The National Institute for Trial Advocacy ("NITA") will present a Rocky Mountain Regional program entitled "Build-
ing Trial Skills" on August 6-16 at the University of Denver College of Law. This intensive, learning-by-doing program
has been approved for 45 general CLE credits, including 2.4 ethics credit.
The program gives participants the opportunity to practice trial techniques and strategies under the watchful eyes of
faculty made up of experienced trial lawyers, judges, and law professors, who will offer constructive and practical sug-
gestions on improving technique. NITA conducts all exercises in simulated courtroom sessions, with immediate per-
formance feedback and a videotape of the performance for further individual review.
The trial skills covered include case analysis; jury selection; opening statements; direct and cross-examination; ex-
amination of lay and expert witnesses; impeachment, rehabilitation, and refreshing recollection; introduction and use of
evidence and demonstrative exhibits; closing arguments; and ethics and professional responsibility. Advocacy issues
to be studied during the program include structuring direct and cross-examinations; determining whether a point is
best made in cross-examination or in closing argument; dealing with evasive witnesses; qualifying the expert witness;
helping your expert be persuasive and understandable; developing a sense for how jurors will perceive testimony; and
choosing and using language in framing questions.
For more information, call NITA at (800) 225-6482 or e-mail to: nita.l@nd.edu.
